Drawing on early work on ethical leadership, we argue that when leaders engage in leader moral hypocrisy (i.e., ethical promotion without ethical demonstration), followers can experience psychological reactance—a negative response to a perceived restriction of freedom—which can have negative downstream consequences. In a survey of employee–manager dyads (study 1), we demonstrate that leader moral hypocrisy is positively associated with follower psychological reactance, which increases follower deviance. In two subsequent laboratory experiments, we find similar patterns of results (study 2) and explore (...) potential alternative mechanisms (study 3). We demonstrate in a final experiment with working adults that the relationship between leader moral hypocrisy and psychological reactance is partly explained by increased perceptions of a leader’s use of power (study 4). We discuss the implications of our findings and advocate for further understanding of the risks associated with psychological reactance in response to leaders and other workplace situations. (shrink)

Unfortunately, business is often associated with unethical behavior. While research has offered a number of explanations for why business might encourage unethical behavior, we argue that how a person frames a situation may provide important insight. Drawing on the decision frame literature, the goal of the current research is to identify the differences in cognitive processing associated with two decision frames dominant in the business ethics literature—business and ethical—and, with that knowledge, examine ways to mitigate the detrimental influence of frame (...) on unethical behavior. We first demonstrate the causal link between frame and misrepresentation, and then identify several differences in cognitive processing—cost–benefit analyses, concern for others, and construal level—that distinguish business and ethical frames, and investigate their effects on misrepresentation. In our final set of studies, we demonstrate that the influence of these frames on misrepresentation can be altered by manipulating these cognitive processes, both mitigating and exacerbating a decision maker’s engagement in misrepresentation. We conclude by summarizing our findings and their potential impact on unethical behavior more broadly. (shrink)

Printed texts of Greek authors reflect a divergence of opinion, some giving σμενος others σμενος Only σμενος is correct, and it was never called in question until Usener drew attention to the spelling σμενος in the Bodleian MS. of Plato and in the Paris MS. of the same author. He was followed by Schanz, who gave σμενος in his editions of Platonic dialogues.

In order to illuminate the similarities and differences between science and theology, we consider an epistemology and methodology for each that can be characterised as a dialectical critical realism. Our approach is deeply indebted to the work of the great Swiss theologian, Karl Barth. Key points are that the object under study determines the method to be used, the community of investigators and the nature of the possible knowledge to be gained; the necessity of a posteriori, rather than a priori (...) reasoning; and that the dialogue between theology and science should account for both the similarities and differences between the two disciplines. The counterintuitive nature of quantum physics is used to illustrate how in science the dialectic element should lead to a critical dimension to realism, and one is forced to engage with reality on its own terms. (shrink)

The adjective Ολος is used very frequently by Theophrastus in his History of Plants. The English word 'curly’ may be accepted as its equivalent in phrases like ‘curly leaves’ or ‘curly roots’; but there is something not quite so natural in an expression like ‘curly wood,’ as when Theophrastus says that the ξνуα ει τ ξύλον ξανθν κα ολον, ‘has yellow and curly wood.’ Sir Arthur Hort has accordingly translated it in many passages by the word ‘close-grained,’ and this not (...) only gives a permissible sense in a large number of passages, but seems to be the only one which yields a good sense in III. 11. 3, where Theophrastus says ‘there are two kinds of ash. Of these one is lofty and of strong growth, with white wood of good fibre, softer, with fewer knots, and of more compact texture .’ Schneider, who recognized only the sense ‘curly,’ felt the absurdity of saying ‘with fewer knots and curlier, and he therefore proposed to substitute νουλότερον . The difficulty vanishes if Sir Arthur Hort's rendering is accepted. (shrink)

The word νóoς must, if it is inherited from Indo-European, be a word of the λóγoς type, and come from Indo-Eur. nósos, nówos, or nóyos, since a consonant must have been lost, and it is known that only s, w, and y vanished between vowels in Greek. Neither nóyos nor nówos can be traced with a suitable meaning in any Indo-European language; nóyos, on the other hand, would be a very probable ancestor of Skr. nayas. The senses of nayas are, (...) I submit, sufficiently close to those of νóoς to lend some support to the identification. They are: ‘leading, performance, behaviour, worldly wisdom, policy, fundamental principle, system, theory.’. (shrink)

The phrase may be rendered ‘uttering thick screams’, these English words bearing the same sense as in Scott,Heart of Midlothian, Chapter XXV.: ‘She proceeded to raise the family by her screams of horror, uttered as thick as if the Brownie had been flaying her.’.

To the instances of non-syllabic ε after -ιλ- or -υλ- which were given in Class. Quart. XVII. 196 , two more may be added: Σιλεωνας, Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca 783 , occurs in a trochaic line, and is scanned Cup – Cup –. Kaibel calls it a ‘nomen suspectum’; but in the re-edition in Anc. Gr.Inscr.in the British Museum, No. 796, the reading is defended by a comparison with Σιλνιος in C.I.G. 1577. 3 = I.G. 7. 2429.